




USAID | **MALI**
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Mali Results Framework Paper



In the spirit of Aid effectiveness and the premise that development built on collaboration is more likely to engender local leadership and ownership, and turn good ideas into lasting results, USAID/Mali hereby invites review and comment on its Results Framework Paper (RF Paper). The RF Paper will inform USAID/Mali's Country Development Cooperation Strategy for 2015-2019. In the coming months, USAID/Mali will consult with the host government, donors, key stakeholders including civil society and the private sector on this strategic framework. Any comments regarding USAID/Mali's RF Paper can be sent to bamakoinfo@usaid.gov until December 31, 2014. Please limit comments to no more than half a page. Thank you!!

Please note the following disclaimers:

- The draft has been provided for informational purposes only and at any time is subject to change;
- The reader bears full responsibility for any actions taken based on information contained in the draft;
- USAID will not be providing any documents referenced in this draft;
- The act of sharing the draft or any information contained therein does not constitute a legal obligation or binding agreement or create or serve as the bases for an obligation of funds by the U.S. government or USAID;
- Any feedback or comments received by USAID may or may not be considered in further development of the strategy; and
- This is not a forum for submitting unsolicited proposals; rather this is a call for comments on the RF paper in order to inform development of the Strategy.

I. Executive Overview

With immense security and developmental challenges, Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world. Mali has a population of 15.3 million (2013), GDP of \$10.4 billion (2012) and per-capita income of \$660 per year. With just over 50% of the population living in extreme poverty on less than \$1.25/day and a life expectancy of 57 years, Mali ranks 182 out of 186 according to the UN's Human Development Index. Health practices such as increased immunizations have improved, but the country experiences a high fertility rate of 6 children per woman (2013) with only 10% of women reported to use modern contraceptives. The mortality rate for children under five dropped from 191/1,000 live births in 2006 to 95/1000 in 2013 and the maternal mortality ratio is 368/100,000 live births in 2013.

Youth represent 69% of Mali's population and are a source of great dynamism, yet they are particularly underserved by the educational system, are struggling to recover from the effects of violent conflict, and lack the basic skills and abilities they need to earn a living. The vast majority of youth in Mali are thus undereducated and underemployed. This is especially critical for female youth, of whom only four in ten have gone to school. While Mali has achieved increased access to education over the past five years, the system faces significant challenges, including high teacher absenteeism, poor educational achievements leading to high levels of grade repetition,¹ lack of evidence-based reading materials, damage and destruction of schools in the North and demand exceeding capacity for southern schools to absorb the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs). With 47% of the population literate, this figure drops in rural areas, which represent 65% of the population, and particularly among women.

Agriculture accounts for over 35% of GDP, and 80% of livelihoods, but year-to-year growth rates have been highly variable, reflecting vulnerability to the vagaries of weather, policy changes, and external shocks. Mali's potential for irrigated agriculture, livestock production and inland fisheries are significant, but increased population pressure on land and water resources, uncertain land tenure conditions, and an educational system that falls short of preparing students for productive jobs in a growing agro-food economy, mixed with policy actions that weaken private-sector incentives to invest, weak agricultural extension and the need to adapt to climate change are key challenges.² Mali ranks 146 out of 189 countries for the ease of "Doing Business," according to the World Bank's 2015 report, with *trading across borders* among Mali's lower ranking indicators. Mobile phone subscription has risen from 3,000 in 1997 to over 11.3 million in 2012³ and the percentage of paved roads has doubled in the last 20 years.⁴

Recent presidential and Parliamentary elections were deemed free and fair, but only 10% of Parliament is female. Planned local elections for early 2015 will be critical for bringing citizens closer to their government. The GOM has launched several anti-corruption initiatives, including the establishment of a general auditor's office, but enforcement of findings is lacking. Recent contracts for a Presidential plane and arms outside the GOM budget and scope of good governance have led donors to question planned budget support. Mali ranks 127 out of 177 on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. The Press is considered relatively free for Africa, though financial viability tarnishes independence; freedoms of assembly and association are respected. The new Minister of Decentralization has pledged an ambitious goal to increase revenue allocation from the national level to the regions, from its current 12% to 30% by 2020. Ensuring capacity to manage resources effectively will be a priority.

¹ According to UNESCO data, Grade 5 is repeated 18% in Mali, compared to 3% in the Gambia and 5% in Senegal.

² Mali Agricultural Sector Assessment, 2011, Michigan State University Food Security Team.

³ Sub-Saharan Africa Mobile Observatory 2012 of GSMA.

⁴ <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/mali/roads>. Accessed 3/22/11.

In response to these challenges, USAID/Mali's proposed five year strategy will support the following goal: ***Maliens secure a democratic, resilient and prosperous future***. Unique to previous USAID/Mali strategies, USAID will pursue a two pronged-approach that integrates improved governance and resilience across USAID's traditional technical assistance sectors of health, economic growth, and education. Leveraging governance and resilience expertise and resources will target Mali's institutional weaknesses and extreme poverty through a whole-of-Mission approach. At the same time, reduced stove piping will contribute to increased cost-effectiveness and sustainability of USAID investments.

Integration of **Democracy and Governance (DG)** with the Mission's prosperity work will reinforce Mission efforts for inclusive development and reduction of extreme poverty. DG will also support whole-of-government cooperation in the area of Rule of Law to ensure that communities benefitting from development will experience increased governing presence and not be adversely affected by new investments. DG will champion Mali's decentralization efforts and co-chair the Civil Society Technical & Financial Partners (PTF) donor group to bolster good governance and civic participation.

Integration of **Resilience** will ensure that the needs of extremely poor, vulnerable communities, households and people are addressed, increasing their ability to reduce and manage risks, and reduce dependency on humanitarian aid. The resilience objective will integrate and coordinate transition, development and humanitarian assistance programs to target populations vulnerable to various shocks and stresses caused by climate change and variability, market uncertainty and conflict. In Mali the most vulnerable populations are primarily located in the agro-ecological zone known as the Sahel where average annual rainfall is only 200-600 millimeters. Building resilience of vulnerable populations in that zone and across Mission programs will significantly contribute to the Mission's goal of reducing extreme poverty, securing an inclusive, democratic and prosperous future for Malians.

Traditional development assistance to the North is hampered due to security concerns and limited access. Therefore, USAID will administer a **Transitional Objective (TO)** over the next two to three years that will deliver near-term tangible humanitarian and stabilization support at the community level. Programming will help to mitigate conflict within and among ethnic groups, support peaceful democratic transition and enhance reconciliation and security through essential public services support, employment opportunities, and conflict mediation for citizens residing in the North and to IDPs and refugees affected by the collapse of the state and vulnerable to extremism.

Once security permits, USAID intends to scale core **Governance, Resilience and Prosperity Programming** on-going in the rest of the country to areas in the North. This includes strengthening public delivery of health and education services, and fostering economic growth, particularly in the agricultural sector, to boost incomes, nutrition, and employment. Emphasis will be placed on youth and women. USAID will support institutional strengthening in direct partnership with the Malian Government, furthering the GOM's decentralization goals, strengthening the public's trust in government, as well as partnering with the private sector to scale-up adoption of technology and innovation to boost economic opportunities and prosperity over the longer term.

USAID/Mali will leverage regional actors and resources, in concert with the USG and other donors. The Mission's portfolio will contribute to US foreign policy and human development priorities, and USAID *Forward* goals of using host-country systems, evaluation, innovation, and mobile money. The CDCS will also directly support the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), Feed the Future (FTF) initiative, the Global Climate Change (GCC) Initiative, the Trans-Sahel Countering Terrorism Program (TSCTP), and USAID's Education Strategy.

II. U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security Considerations

Mali is emerging from multiple crises, including a January 2012 rebellion in the North, a coup d'état followed by an attempted counter coup, and ongoing conflict with extremist groups in the North. These crises exposed weaknesses in Mali's democratic institutions and created opportunities for traffickers and terrorists to seek safe haven within the country's borders. Located at the center of the Sahel, a democratic and secure Mali will help stabilize the region as we confront terrorism in this volatile environment. French and international forces through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the third largest UN Peacekeeping Mission in the world, continue to protect Mali's territorial integrity while encouraging continued progress in implementing the peace accord and supporting reconciliation.

Mali has begun the slow process of rebuilding itself and restoring democracy. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected in September 2013 with 77% of the vote in elections with an historically high voter turnout. Malians elected their National Assembly in November and December 2013. Municipal elections planned for early 2015 will be a critical step in bringing government closer to citizens. The new government has made national reconciliation a top priority. Despite persistent poverty, progress has been made on social indicators, including declines in under-five child mortality.

USAID foreign assistance has played a critical role in the rebuilding effort. During the suspension of programs following the coup d'état, development assistance that saved lives, improved food security, and supported the elections continued. Following the election of President Keita, USG legal and policy restrictions were lifted, and all development programming resumed. Select assistance interventions have targeted vulnerable and perilous regions in northern Mali.

Successful elections, securing much of the formerly occupied territories, and the resumption of foreign aid, however, do not guarantee that Mali will continue on the path toward prosperity. The underlying institutional weaknesses in the governing system that were unobserved, or ignored, by many Malians and international actors before the crises, could easily manifest again if political actors are not held accountable by citizens and donors. As USAID/Mali's recent Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) Assessment noted, the "consensual nature of governing, and the institutional failure to hold politicians accountable for their actions, fostered public perceptions of unchecked corruption and patronage amongst political elites."⁵ Unless the root causes that led to rebellions and state collapse are addressed, the DRG assessment concludes, "Mali will remain extremely vulnerable to political instability, the continuation of business-as-usual, and renewed conflict."

As part of a complex region, the Sahel is plagued by chronic poverty, instability, conflict, and rising extremism. USAID/Mali, working in concert with regional USAID platforms and the USG more broadly, seeks to address development challenges in this fragile and evolving region while working with partners to improve stability, decrease extreme poverty, and promote a resilient, democratic society. Continued engagement with the Malian government, defense and development partners, local civic groups, like-minded donors, and the new generation of innovators will be critical to addressing Mali's complex development challenges.

⁵ USAID/Mali and USAID/W/DCHM conducted a DRG assessment in early 2014; the final version will further inform CDCS development.

III. Government of Mali (GOM) Priorities


Mali is in a state of transition with a dynamic security environment, on-going negotiations for reconciliation with key stakeholders in the North, and continuous shifts and appointments of new leaders in key positions. That said, several overarching documents and strategies guide the international community, including the USG and USAID, at the macro as well as sector levels. The GOM's well-established collective donor coordination forum, *Les Partenaires Techniques et Financiers (PTF)*, coordinates dialogue between technical and financial partners and the GOM. USAID actively participates in five of seven thematic groups, including: Agriculture & Rural Economy, Justice, Civil Society, Education and Health. The PTF vigorously seeks to ensure envisioned investments are in line with Mali's strategic choices and priorities in target sectors. This table summarizes USAID's proposed objectives and corresponding GOM guiding strategies and policies.

USAID/Mali proposed Development Objectives (FY 2015-2019)	GOM Strategic Plans, Policies and Programs
TO 1. Transition: Relief, Stabilization & Early Recovery of Conflict Affected Areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Action Plan for National Reconciliation, Ministry of National Reconciliation (interim GOM) - Emergency Priority Action Plan (PAPU 2013-2014)
DO 1. Democratic Governance: Public Trust in Government Improved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government Action Program (PAG) Governance Strategy for Mali - Sub National Governance Strategy (TBD) - Justice Sector Strategy (TBD)⁶
DO 2. Resilience: Adaptive Capacity and ability to Reduce/Manage Risk Among Vulnerable Communities & Households Increased	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Food Security Plan - National Nutrition Policy - Strategic Framework for Growth & Poverty Reduction (CSCR/2012-2017) - National Policy on Climate Change (PNCC/2011) - National Investment Plan for the Agricultural Sector - Mali's National Resilience Plan (under development) to inform the CDCS
DO 3. Prosperity: Socio-Economic Well-Being Advanced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Health and Social Development Plan (PDDSS) - Health Sector Development Program (PRODESS) - Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP/ 2012-2017) - Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program Strategy (CAADP) - Economic Recovery and Development Program (PRED) - Government Action Program (PAG) - Education Sector Investment Program (PISE) III - Ten year Education Development Plan (PRODEC I), and draft PRODEC II

⁶GOM is in the process to develop these sector strategies and policies.

USAID/Mali Results Framework (2015-2019)

Maliens Secure a Democratic, Resilient, and Prosperous Future



IV. Strategy Goal & Development Hypothesis

Strategy Goal:

USAID/Mali will focus on a TO and three development objectives (DOs) to contribute to the goal: **Maliens secure a democratic, resilient and prosperous future.** While embracing the necessary and constructive role that USAID resources and programs play, this goal focuses on Malians taking the initiative, holding each other accountable, and demanding a better future. It puts equal weight on both society and state to peacefully restore the social contract and ensure that steady gains in education, health and food security continue for all Malians.⁷ USAID/ Mali will achieve this goal through integrated programs that address: I) immediate relief and stabilization needs (**transition**); II) the root causes of the crisis and the binding constraints to long-term development (**democratic governance**); III) targeted communities, households, and individuals vulnerable to both natural and man-made shocks and stresses (**resilience**); and, IV) the socio- economic pillars for sustained well-being: health, economic growth, and education (**prosperity**).

Development Hypothesis:

The rationale for USAID/Mali's programming from FY 2015-2019 is based on the recognition that governance and resilience are essential to fostering sustainable development. Programming will also reflect the reality that until reconciliation is fully secured, a two-phased approach, giving precedence to activities likely to deliver near-term tangible economic and reconciliation benefits in the North while administering traditional health, economic growth, and education programming in Mali's permissive population centers throughout the rest of the country will be necessary.

Programs will coordinate and leverage all forms of transition, humanitarian and development assistance to support Malian-led efforts to reconcile, provide services equitably and efficiently, and address the root causes of the recent complex emergency. It will support Malian efforts to restore the social contract that will provide the foundation for security and long-term development. If programs concertedly address the causes of, and pathways out of, destabilization and poverty, then the foundation for sustainable development in Mali will be restored.

The programmatic emphasis of the CDCS will be integration. Breaking down silos, USAID/Mali will ensure sufficient personnel and resources, and properly structured management units, multi-disciplinary and virtual teams, to develop cutting-edge, cross-sectoral programs to achieve DOs. The Democratic Governance DO, for example, will not simply be supported by limited resources provided by good governance funds; rather, it will combine and leverage a range of governance and policy resources from various technical sectors to ensure efficient service delivery and build public trust between citizens and the GOM. The Resilience DO will oversee a host of health, livelihood and conflict mitigation resources to ensure that vulnerable populations and the extreme poor in targeted areas are supported to build their adaptive capacity to climate change, reduce their depth of poverty, and mitigate their risk to conflict. The Resilience DO will also apply a resilience lens to support other program designs and DOs across the Mission. USAID investments in health, economic growth, and education sectors, likewise, will benefit from support for improved governance and resilience as USAID programming aims to achieve ambitious targets in public service delivery and economic growth.

⁷ Both the Systems Analysis conducted in late 2013 and the DRG assessment in early 2014 pointed to the break of the social contract as one of the major governance issue in the country.

Illustrative Goal-Level Performance Indicators:

1. Agriculture Sector Gross Domestic Product Increased (2012/\$903,820,000)
2. Maternal and Child Deaths Reduced (Maternal:368/2013 - Child:98/2013)
3. Youth (5-24 yrs) Literacy Increased (2011/47%)
4. Depth of Poverty Reduced (TBD)⁸
5. Accountability Increased (TBD)
6. Conflict-Affected communities stabilized and relief provided (TBD)

Critical Assumptions:

1. Mali will continue to actively pursue a resolution with northern actors and the broader nation on the parameters for national reconciliation.
2. Reconciliation coupled with sustained presence of international and Malian armed forces, improved security will allow for the gradual implementation of strategic development programs in northern Mali; occasional terrorist attacks, however, will continue in the North and remote portions of the country will remain insecure in the near-term.
3. Refugees and IDPs will continue to return voluntarily; insecurity will not trigger unmanageable refugee flows.
4. Democratic consolidation continues through: the holding of local elections; establishment of more organized and respected opposition parties; active and constructive citizen engagement; and improved press freedoms.
5. The Malian government will take active and concrete measures to combat corruption, as well as improve mobilization of tax revenue to reduce dependency upon aid.
6. Decentralization will remain the key to effective governance and service delivery; despite potential progress in effectiveness and efficiency, however, significant dysfunction will persist.

Lessons learned:

Even with elections and prospects for reconciliation, USAID/Mali does not intend to return to “business as usual” as prior to the coup. Linked to these critical assumptions is the recognition, based on previous experience and lessons learned, that weaknesses in the areas of democracy and security could adversely affect the Mission’s ability to achieve key development objectives and that these factors may require periodic re-evaluation. Significant improvements in both governance and security are fundamental for almost any measure of development success, and are paramount for USG resources to be responsibly and optimally invested in Mali. With the Mission’s transition and development programs, the CDCS aims to reduce democratic governance and security deficits.

Governance: The CDCS will seek to ensure that foreign assistance does not absolve the GOM of its responsibility to provide for its citizens or invite a return to the environment of aid dependency witnessed before the coup. The vast and necessary resources provided to Mali to address its vital

⁸ The Depth of Poverty is a new measure that will be introduced. So far Mali’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (CSCR) was reporting on the Prevalence of Poverty as a proxy, which was estimated at 43% in 2010.

security, development and humanitarian needs must engender accountability – both of and between citizens and the government, as well as of donors themselves. Therefore, USAID/Mali will seek to integrate principles of good governance and institutional strengthening throughout. USAID/Mali will do this in concert with other donors through respective Technical and Financial Partner (PTF) sector coordination groups and through support for high-level bilateral dialogue between the USG and GOM. The Mission and USG more broadly have various tools and incentives, such as increasing levels of Government-to-Government (G2G) assistance, and/or leveraging the role of other potential development partners in Mali, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

Security: Before the coup d'état, implementing development assistance in northern Mali was not easy. The vast territory is sparsely populated, the infrastructure is poor, and insecurity persists due to smuggling, banditry and kidnapping. Personnel under Chief of Mission authority have largely been prohibited from travelling to northern Mali, greatly limiting USAID's ability to monitor program implementation. These challenges have heightened with recent events. While emergency and humanitarian efforts continue to operate throughout Mali, including in the North, the current situation is tense and the operating environment is unpropitious for long-term development assistance. Nonetheless, the region has significant development needs and is of great import to the USG in terms of security. All DOs highlighted below contain programs designed to be implemented in secure areas immediately and scaled-up to northern regions when the security environment permits. During Stage 3 of the CDCS process, USAID/Mali will work with the GOM, donors, the Embassy and other security experts to refine benchmarks that could allow for resumed assistance in the North, recognizing, however, that the situation is fluid and varies across geography.

V. Proposed Transitional and Development Objectives, and Results

I. Transitional Objective

Transitional Objective 1: Relief, Stabilization and Early Recovery of Conflict Affected Areas

Transition Hypothesis: If emergency humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations is provided, community-level and national-level reconciliation facilitated, and early stage health and education public services are strategically coupled with the provision of security, then the foundation for long-term development efforts to be effective will be ensured.

Achieving a durable peace in northern Mali will require resolution of conflicts among multiple ethnic groups themselves and with the GOM. Perceptions of neglect of the North's ethnic groups; lack of public service provision, including the rule of law; corruption; ethnic tensions; a history of past abuses perpetrated by both Malian troops and armed rebel groups; and northern populations' overall mistrust of the GOM are considered contributing factors to the breakdown between Mali's northern regions and the rest of the country. To date, the GOM's leadership to advance reconciliation has not been proactive. Events in Kidal in May highlighted the need to focus on negotiation over military intervention if peace is to be secured. Once the GOM engages multiple stakeholders in dialogue, including armed groups, negotiations will clarify governing structures, support for decentralization, and the political roadmap necessary for development to take place. Re-establishment of social and technical services will represent "normalcy" and that the conditions for development investment have been achieved.

While accounting for only 10 percent of the country's population, remote and largely ungoverned parts of northern Mali provide operating space for Islamic extremist groups, narco-traffickers, transnational

crime, and domestic Malian rebel groups. Administering assistance requires unique approaches and accommodations to reach beneficiary populations. Until a durable peace, reconciliation, or negotiated settlement between and among ethnic groups in the North and with the GOM is achieved, USAID proposes to administer assistance through a TO, which will allow for the provision of emergency assistance and initial health and education services through unique approaches that will differ from traditional assistance as provided for the majority of the country. The TO provides USAID with flexibility to adjust programming as events unfold on the ground, with the ultimate goal of achieving an environment in which sustainable development can occur.

In order to provide humanitarian or development assistance, security is an absolute necessity. Mali and governments across the region face security threats, including terrorism and cross-border criminal activity. Current provision of security in the North is now being provided by a mix of actors -- varying from armed groups to French forces under Operation Barkhane, to MINUSMA, the MNLA, the GOM and the Malian Army. A framework for operating in the North is contingent upon national and local reconciliation, which will also confirm the degree of decentralization of authorities and responsibilities. Assuming sufficient political will by both the GOM and northern armed groups, the TO envisions that within two to three years, upon completion, a sufficient foundation will be established to be able to transition to the full spectrum of USAID development assistance activities. As in other countries, humanitarian interventions will continue to be provided whenever and wherever assistance is warranted, regardless of the TO outcome.

USAID/Mali is already providing foreign assistance throughout Mali, including the North - transition initiatives, humanitarian efforts, and even select development assistance - to both secure and improve Malians' health and livelihoods, and to lay the foundation for more long-term programming. These programs are vital to the rebuilding confidence, and when properly coordinated, are paramount to laying the foundation for longer-term development. Support for beneficiaries of the three Transitional Intermediate Results (TIRs) will be reinforced with the aim of identifying change agents for the future. Beyond USAID or the USG's manageable interests, however, ultimately trust between ethnic and religious groups and political factions must be secured for a durable peace.

Expected Results:

As a result of assistance, human suffering in the North will be mitigated through basic health and education service provision; stabilization efforts will help strengthen communities against conflict; and key champions will be identified for furthering future development. Support for the national-level peace process will contribute to reconciliation, and ultimately, a return of security which will allow for administering the full spectrum of development assistance across the North.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of NGOs/international partners implementing development programs in the north
- Percentage/number of returnees
- Low levels of community conflict remain norm (survey), or # community conflicts resolved
- Increasing anecdotal (survey when applicable) perceptions that 'normalcy' is returning⁹
- Progress continues to be made on a final peace agreement

Critical Assumptions:

- Mali will resolve with northern actors and broader nation, the parameters for reconciliation.
- International actors (donors, negotiators, security) will continue to be strongly engaged.
- GOM will maintain political will to combat terrorism in Mali and the broader Sahel region.
- USAID/OTI, USAID/OFDA, USAID/FFP, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) resources are provided.

Alignment with GOM Plans, Policies, and Programs:

- Action Plan for National Reconciliation
- Ministry of National Reconciliation (interim GOM)
- Emergency Priority Action Plan (PAPU 2013-2014)

Transition Intermediate Result (TIR) 1: Emergency humanitarian support to conflict-affected populations provided

Premise: Populations in the North suffer from lack of basic services and continue to be victims of violence. A chronic crisis marked by food insecurity and a high rate of malnutrition is exacerbated by the volatility of security in the North and center of Mali. This, in turn, has resulted in the continuing displacement of 288,000 Malians and a loss of livelihoods, assets and shelter. A foundation for durable peace cannot be established as long as livelihoods are disrupted and insecurity prohibits the return to normalcy. Until a durable peace is found, USAID and other humanitarian actors will continue to provide basic life-saving assistance, working with a range of actors in the North.

Development Hypothesis: If emergency humanitarian aid is provided to conflict-prone populations; human suffering and the absence of support to local populations will be mitigated, thus helping citizens to meet their basic needs and laying a foundation for stability.

There are 1.5 million Malians affected by severe food insecurity; 496,000 children under five years are threatened by acute malnutrition, and 3 million people urgently need support for the upcoming farming season.¹⁰ This year's UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) appeal request is the highest out of nine countries of the Sahel region; of \$568 million requested this year, representing a \$100 million increase from 2013; only 20 percent of the funds have been mobilized.¹¹ May events in Kidal highlight the extent to which security and stability are indispensable prerequisites for improving the people's living conditions, including in the most remote areas.

USAID has and will continue to provide emergency food aid and support for early recovery to vulnerable populations throughout Mali and particularly to the North. Livelihoods and livestock; health and nutrition; psycho-social protection; water, sanitation, and hygiene and other assistance will be provided to the most vulnerable who remained in their home communities as well as to those who have returned. In addition, USAID will support internally displaced populations (IDPs), primarily through the provision of unconditional cash grants and vouchers for health and protection services. Successful integration of sustainable development components, such as basic inputs for income generation and vocational training, are included while the focus will be on meeting basic subsistence needs. As conditions permit, close links between TO IRs will promote, where possible, community-level peace building and re-

¹⁰ According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Press Release 06-17-14.

¹¹ Humanitarian Actors Demand Substantial Financial Assistance To Boost Food Security, Info-Matin 13 Jun 14 p 10.

establishment of basic public service delivery, which will align with sub-national service delivery across the country.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of people benefiting from agricultural input activities disaggregated by sex
- Number of animals benefiting from or affected by livestock activities
- Number of households receiving emergency/transitional shelter assistance
- Number of people assisted through new livelihoods development activities by sex
- Number and percent of pregnant women attended to at comprehensive antenatal clinics
- Number of people trained in child protection, disaggregated by sex
- Number of individuals benefitting from GBV services by sex

TIR 2: Support for democratic reconciliation provided

Premise: Mitigation of tension within and among competing ethnic groups and inclusion of Mali's northern communities in the country's on-going democratic transition are paramount to laying the foundation for an inclusive Mali. Furthering GOM appreciation for the needs of population groups through greater use of public-opinion tools and analysis will contribute to increased understanding, and in turn dialogue and ultimately resolution of the conflict.

Development Hypothesis: If community-level conflicts in the North are mitigated, the population's participation in national level electoral processes sought, and GOM efforts to understand and engage the North supported, then the foundation for a durable peace can be strengthened.

The Republic of Mali has returned to representative republican democracy following successful presidential and parliamentary elections. This has been followed by progress on holding those accountable who interrupted constitutional rule and the re-engagement of Mali within the international community.

USAID will continue to support Mali's peaceful democratic transition in the North with strategic activities that address key issues for assuring a return of liberty. These currently include but are not limited to support to national and local reconciliation and the peace process. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming will focus on assisting grassroots reconciliation and helping to re-stitch the social fabric after the extremist occupation. Through many small activities in local communities, programs will seek to address root causes of violent conflict and extremism.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of disputes resolved, people/ethnic groups aided by community resolution activities
- Number of local organizations, and/or ethnic groups involved in the peace process
- Increased anecdotal evidence of nationwide support for a final peace agreement (surveys)

TIR 3: Essential health and education services provided

Premise: Without basic health and education service provision, gains in human development may be jeopardized and an entire generation of Malian youth could be lost. To the extent possible, provision of basic emergency health and education support services for those who remained or are returning home

after being displaced by the conflict, are essential from both a humanitarian perspective and for sustaining the institutional infrastructure for basic service provision with the rest of the country.

Development Hypothesis: If restoration of basic health and education services can be sustained, the foundation for development will be nurtured once political reconciliation is achieved.

The crisis in the North caused a massive population movement. As of April 2013, children accounted for more than 85,000 of the total 300,000 IDPs. While 137,000 IDPs have returned to the North, they face limited access to education; schools and equipment have been destroyed; school administration barely present. The crisis resulted in students missing years of schooling; lack of learning materials; exodus of qualified teachers; and traumatized students, teachers, and communities. As guided by USAID's Global Education Strategy, education in post-conflict crisis environments, USAID's emergency education interventions in targeted communities will ensure that safe and accessible schools and learning spaces are established, and remedial instruction/catch-up programs for children who missed out on school are offered. Programming will address school infrastructure and provide teacher training on tolerance in a post-conflict context.

In Mali's northern regions (Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal) and three districts in Mopti region (Youwarou, Tenenkou and Douentza), health services were largely rendered non-functioning during the rebel occupation. Regional hospitals and District and Community health centers were looted of all supplies and medicines. Rehabilitation of these health services continues to be a top priority. Needs include replacing clinical equipment and furniture, refrigerators to store vaccines, and replenishing medicines and related supplies. Many staff, regardless of their origin within Mali, fled the North because their homes were ransacked or they were fearful of being attacked. The Ministry of Health has requested support to help redeploy staff to these districts. IDPs and refugees have been slow to return in 2014, particularly after defeat of government troops in Kidal in May.

In response, USAID will continue to ensure the procurement and distribution of essential health commodities throughout Mali in the areas of maternal and child health, reproductive health and family planning (including fistula preventative care and treatment), nutrition, malaria prevention and treatment, HIV prevention; water, sanitation and hygiene, and nutrition commodities. USAID will provide humanitarian assistance in the health and protection sectors to a conflict-affected population of over 260,000 people in the Gourma Rharous and Timbuktu districts.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of schools rehabilitated and communities re-engaged in school management
- Number of health care facilities, with essential health service packages, supported and/or rehabilitated by type (ie: primary, secondary, tertiary)
- Incidence of HIV among sex workers and their clients
- Proportion of children under five sleeping under insecticide treated mosquito nets
- Case fatality rates for malaria, diarrhea, ARI, measles, and other, by sex and age
- Number of supplies distributed by type (e.g., medical kits, equipment, consumables)
- Number and percent of pregnant women attended to at comprehensive antenatal clinics

TIR 4: Transitional justice provided (Joint USAID-State)

Premise: Systematic abuse of human rights that are not adequately addressed are a source of social unrest and often contribute to renewed violence. The process of acknowledging, prosecuting,

compensating for and forgiving past crimes during a period of rebuilding after conflict is commonly referred to as “transitional justice.” USAID will therefore prioritize the (re)establishment of the rule of law after the political crisis of 2012 to help further the reconciliation process and build sustainable peace and a legitimate, well-functioning state.

Development Hypothesis: If credible efforts are made to acknowledge and address human rights abuses committed during the crisis, the GOM will further stability, reconciliation and transition to a lasting peace.


Mali’s March 2012 coup d’état, and the subsequent seizure of the country’s North by a mix of separatist and Islamist groups, led to a rapid deterioration in Mali’s human rights situation, with abuses committed by the coup leaders, rebel groups and the Malian army. These abuses, which exacerbated inter-community and intra-community divisions and further undermined Malians trust in state institutions, have the potential to endanger Mali’s long-term stability. One of the key duties of the new government is to see that human rights abuses committed during the crisis are addressed and the perpetrators brought to justice. The government has already started by bringing charges against those accused of participating in massacres associated with the 2012 coup. There is an urgent need to push forward with these trials now while the government still enjoys a popular mandate and is motivated to be seen, by both the Malian and international community, to punish those who committed human rights violations. During this window of opportunity, civil society has a crucial role to play in pushing the government to pursue justice and to monitor the process.

Together with State Department, USAID will work to improve access to justice for citizens who were victims of human rights abuses. USAID activities will specifically focus on strengthening the capacity of Malian civil society groups to advocate for an effective government response to human rights violations committed during Mali’s crisis. State Department activities will work with justice sector stakeholders to develop the core technical knowledge and skills associated with litigating cases of serious human rights violations.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of human rights cases monitored by CSOs and covered by media
- Number of human rights abuse cases successfully tried

II. Development Objectives



Development Objective 1: Democratic Governance - Public Trust in Government Improved

Development Hypothesis: If responsive and accountable service delivery is increased and the rule of law is respected in Mali, then public trust in government will be improved.

Mali is a severely fragile state whose institutions score extremely low in both effectiveness and legitimacy. This has resulted in a fractured social contract between the GOM and the Malian citizens. A state that is willing and able to provide goods and services to its population and is perceived to be

exercising power in ways that are fair, inclusive, transparent, and accountable can be characterized as effective and legitimate. However, when the relationship between state and society is strained and interactions produce outcomes considered illegitimate or ineffective, the state is considered to be highly fragile. The break down in the social contract in Mali has been fueled by ineffective institutions; weak capacity across institutions, both governmental and non-governmental; significant challenges facing reconciliation and ensuring lasting peace; and inadequate civic engagement.¹² The majority of Malians perceive government effectiveness through accountable service delivery and government legitimacy through consistent and fair application of the rule of law.

The DG program will focus on making Mali a less fragile state, i.e. increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the institutions that comprise the Government of Mali. The majority of Mali's people are poorly connected to, or served by, the public sector. Public institutions lack both material and human resources. Mechanisms for accountability are inadequate, and allegations of corruption are prevalent. These factors undermine rule of law in Mali and contribute to a high degree of civil and political disregard for compliance. Access to justice is also problematic for the majority of Malians. The main problems in the Rule of Law sector do not stem from the lack of a legal framework, but in the failure to apply and enforce it. Unless these issues are addressed, Mali remains vulnerable to the same problems that led to the 2012 crisis and state collapse.

USAID plans to counteract this disturbing trend by integrating governance into all technical sectors focusing and concentrating its governance efforts into a small number of key population centers, thereby creating islands of stability, accountability, and good governance which can serve as models that can be scaled up and replicated throughout the country. The future DG program will be centered around public accountability.

¹² Mali Systems Thinking Analysis 2014, USAID/Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management.

Finally, USAID's DG programs will operate under the premise that the current priority that is given to the North must not obscure the need for comprehensive reforms to address the serious governance problems at the heart of the 2012 crisis. The crisis in the North revealed serious dysfunctions that affect the country as a whole. Malian democracy, previously hailed as a regional example, collapsed suddenly. The entire country, and not only the North, needs stronger governance and economic revival. Prioritizing immediate stabilization – a laudable goal in light of current difficulties and one which the DG programs will contribute to – should improve governance practices in Mali.

Expected Results:

USAID/Mali's Governance objective will help to improve public service delivery down to the local level in select geographies, and promote a rule of law culture. This will contribute to increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of, and trust in, the Malian government.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
- World Bank Governance Index percentile rankings for government accountability and effectiveness

Critical Assumptions:

- Communal elections take place
- The current government adheres to a reformist agenda
- Local governments show a commitment to combatting corruption
- The peace agreement continues to be valid
- Fighting ceases in the northern districts

Alignment with GOM Plans, Policies, and Programs:

- Government Action Program (PAG) Governance Strategy for Mali
- Decentralization Strategy (TBD)
- Justice Sector Strategy (TBD)

IR 1.1 Responsive and Accountable Local Service Delivery Increased (Government Effectiveness)

Premise: Insurgency occurs when governance fails, therefore the first line of defense against an insurgency is good governance. For the majority of Malians, effective and accountable governance is measured through the provision of government services at the sub-national level. The recent insurgency by AQIM and other armed groups resulted from an opportunistic set of circumstances related to ungoverned spaces in the North coupled with a lack of government service delivery throughout the country that fueled the coup d'état.

Development Hypothesis: If effectiveness of GOM oversight institutions is improved; national, regional, and district public service delivery systems are strengthened; public financial management is strengthened, and the business enabling environment is improved, then responsive and accountable service delivery will increase.

USAID/Mali intends to work cross-sectorally to accomplish this IR focused on strengthening Mali's effectiveness as a state. While USAID will work throughout the country, we will employ slightly nuanced

approaches in the South versus the North where GOM presence continues to be weak. Extending beyond the Health, Education, and Water sectors, this IR also encompasses services that affect the private sector such as business licensing. The vast bulk of Malians do not receive services from their government. While the formal apparatus exists to enable greater involvement of the citizenry in their own governance, the incentives for citizens to participate at the sub-national level have not materialized. One principal DG problem stems from inadequate participation in democratic governance by the majority of Malians.¹³ Mali has not experienced growth with equity, and the informal barriers to greater participation in some communes have caused the previous decentralization policy to fail. In the past, too much focus on supporting decentralization policy, training for elected officials, and on parallel funding through NGOs to deliver services, resulted in bypassing key governmental actors in local development, the municipality or commune.

Transparency in the provision of public resources and the formulation of policy is an integral part of a democracy. Government accountability is facilitated by approaches, mechanisms, and practices to ensure that its activities and outputs meet the intended goals and standards. Without information on performance, outputs, and motivations, it has been difficult for Malians to hold their government accountable for its actions. Transparency and accountability serve as a check against mismanagement and corruption by public officials, and serve as the foundation of sound governance which is key to winning and maintaining the trust of Malian citizens, the private sector, and the international community. The recent creation of a stand-alone Ministry of Decentralization and the appointment of, Ousmane Sy, the original architect of Decentralization in Mali and an outspoken critic of the GOM's stalled decentralization efforts over the past 10 years shows revived political will on the GOM side to reform the system of sub national governance. In addition to being an effective counter- insurgency tool, USAID's support for sub-national service delivery will enable the Malian people to improve their lives in tangible ways, through concrete small-scale development initiatives from the bottom-up. The optic of being able to improve the lives of people in communities through greater engagement in subnational governance will serve to motivate greater involvement of the social capital that exists at the base but which is not yet well-harnessed to the formal political system.¹⁴

This IR will work with both civil society and selected local governments to strengthen the link between the citizens and the Government of Mali. Past interventions have been designed to strengthen either the demand or supply of transparency and accountability, meaning that they targeted either civil society or the state, but seldom both ends of the spectrum. Lessons learned over the past several years reveal a growing body of research that suggests sustainable, scalable transformation calls for bridging state and civil society drivers of change. USAID will bridge the gap between supply and demand side of accountability and reward municipalities who demonstrate a commitment to good governance by building sound systems that connect the sub-national to the national level and provide resources for transparent service delivery. USAID/Mali will also strengthen the fiscal transfer system between Bamako and selected municipalities, working at both the national and subnational level, ensuring transparent financial flows to the subnational level and public participation in the resource planning, allocation, and execution process.

Working at both the national level and in selected municipalities to increase transparency, accountability, and responsive governance will serve as a model for the rest of the country reducing corruption, insecurity, and improving government performance.

¹³ USAID/Mali DRG assessment 2011.

¹⁴ USAID, "Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Mali In-Country Assessment Report," September 2010.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Public satisfaction with local government performance as measured by local survey
- Percentage of citizens who participate on policy and budget issues
- Percentage of citizens expressing positive opinions of government responsiveness in Afrobarometer surveys

IR 1.2 Rule of Law Respected (Government Legitimacy)

Premise: In parts of Mali, citizens were caught between corrupt elites and powerful extremists promising salvation or material benefits through criminality and political violence. Extremists were able to subvert or destroy the traditional justice system and shut down any official justice process working in areas they control. Thus, USAID sees support for traditional justice as a means of immediate dispute resolution in parts of Mali and linking the formal and informal justice system as a longer term goal.

Development Hypothesis: Recognizing that critically minded and informed individuals are the building blocks of an open society, if a rule of law culture is promoted through civic education and traditional and formal rule of law systems are strengthened and linked, then the state will be seen as legitimate and rule of law will be respected in Mali.

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) defines Rule of Law as “an end state in which all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. Laws must be consistent with international human rights norms and standards, legally certain, legally transparent, drafted with procedural transparency, and publicly promulgated. This end state requires equal enforcement and equality before the law, independent adjudication of the law, fairness in the application of the law, and avoidance of arbitrariness. Access to justice —the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through informal or formal institutions of justice—is a mutually reinforcing component of rule of law. The rule of law requires the separation of powers and participation in decision making.” This results framework will use the USIP definition of Rule of Law and agrees that stabilization requires urgent focus toward this end. We also acknowledge that the formal state-administered justice system coexists with informal systems of justice provision and community dispute resolution in Mali.

Rule of law separates societies where citizens feel secure and free to develop their individual potential, from others where people live in fear of the state’s arbitrary actions or of criminals enabled or emboldened by corruption and public apathy. The rule of law is also the glue that holds together the various structural elements of a democracy, and it cannot be fully developed without citizen buy-in. It takes more than free and fair elections and competent government institutions to produce economic development, political order, and stability. Citizens and government officials must believe that they have a personal stake in upholding the rule of law and preventing crime and corruption in order to consolidate Mali’s democracy. All Malians should expect that laws should be fair and apply equally to all citizens and that every individual has a role in creating and overseeing the implementation of these laws. Public participation in the making of laws and oversight in their implementation, coupled with the demand that both rulers and the ruled be governed by the law, will guard against the arbitrary exercise of state power and against general lawlessness.

While the GOM has pledged to bring justice closer to its citizens, geographical, cultural, and monetary obstacles to accessing courts and tribunals will prevent the majority of Malians from accessing the formal justice system throughout the strategy period. Also, local government actors are given authority

by law to mediate civil or commercial disputes among citizens.¹⁵ It is therefore likely that informal authorities, particularly family elders, religious leaders, and local governments will remain fundamental to access to justice in Mali and will hear and probably solve the majority of justice problems.¹⁶


To this end, USAID will strive to create a “culture of lawfulness” which will create the environment for democracy and the rule of law to flourish in Mali by focusing on the both the state and traditional justice systems (the supply side of rule of law) and educating the clients of justice services (the demand side of rule of law).

Illustrative Indicators:

- World Justice Project Rule of Law Indicators
- World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments
- Afrobarometer surveys
- Community surveys

Development Objective 2: Resilience - Adaptive Capacity and ability to reduce and manage risk among Vulnerable Communities and Households Improved.

Development Hypothesis: Within a focused zone for resilience and across the Mission, if basic nutrition, health and water supply are improved; if adaptive capacity to variable climatic regimes are strengthened; if conflict-mitigating measures are implemented; and economic livelihoods diversified, then chronically vulnerable populations in agro-pastoral and marginal agriculture livelihood zones will become more resilient.



While Mali does not require high-levels of emergency assistance on a cyclical basis, there are vulnerable populations whose stability and growth potential are constrained or hindered by different recurring shocks and stresses (ie: droughts, floods, high or volatile food prices, insecurity). In the Sahel, climate variability (primarily manifested through drought) is the number one, most recurring stress. Food insecurity is often a result of a climate shock. While droughts and flooding affect the spread of human diseases, health and productivity of animals, and management of natural resources, migration patterns can also lead to conflict. Episodes of violent conflict, such as recently experienced in Mali,

¹⁵ Law Creating Units of Local Government article 68 (Law No. 95/034/AN/RM, April 12, 1995; Law Relating to the Creation and Administration of Villages, Fractions, and Neighborhoods article 15 (Law No. 06-023, June 28, 2006)

¹⁶ 2012 *Access to Justice Assessment for Mali*, American Bar Association

further erode the physical and economic security of households and communities. The combined destructive impacts of internal violent conflict on economic growth, public health systems, education, and the physical environment further erode resilience of people and communities. When a state is unable to provide relief or assistance to its society in the face of a major destabilizing shock, climatic or otherwise, it cannot bolster the resilience of its citizens, thus increasing the risk of future conflict.¹⁷

The resilience objective will therefore integrate and coordinate transition, development and humanitarian assistance programs to target populations vulnerable to various shocks and stresses caused by climate change and variability, market uncertainty and conflict. The types of interventions that build resilience are not new to USAID or Mali programs. They include, but are not limited to: building strategic information and decision-making systems; emergency food and non-food assistance; cash transfers; basic health services; community management of acute malnutrition; improved natural resource management; disaster and economic risks reduction; local conflict mitigation and governance; livelihood support; and inclusive value chain activities. These interventions will help achieve the intermediate results of the Resilience DO, as well as those that fall under the Prosperity DO. The Resilience DO team will be responsible for ensuring the layering, sequencing, and integrating¹⁸ of a variety of health and livelihood programs that target the poorest and most vulnerable populations both within the Resilience DO which will concentrate efforts geographically, and beyond the Resilience DO through providing a “resilience lens” to the work of other DO teams across the Mission. Integrating resilience across the Mission’s objectives will be essential to mitigate against the risks and threats that can undermine prosperity and other development goals.

Regarding specific Resilience programming, USAID/Mali, the Resilience team in USAID/Senegal, and technical support from USAID/Washington established an analytical foundation for the resilience approach. Through their analysis, the region of Mopti – in particular, the districts of Djenne, Mopti, Bankass and Bandiagara – was identified as offering the greatest need with the highest potential for resilience programming. These zones represent the intersection of the highest climate vulnerability, population density (Annex 1, maps A1, A2, A3), and the gateway to northern Mali while not being as affected by violent conflict currently constraining USAID’s ability to operate in those areas. Mopti contains several Feed the Future (FTF) districts, and the health team’s nutrition interventions are already underway there. It is also the targeted geographic region for a new climate change program. While USAID’s development activities were re-located out of Mopti owing to the conflict in the North, there is the potential for these activities to return in FY 2015 and offer an additional layer of programming. As USAID/Mali does not receive any funds specifically for resilience, the Mission will leverage planned programming in the Mopti region, and set aside funds (from selected “earmarks”) for the activities under the Resilience DO.

¹⁷ Mali Resilience Program Assessment Challenges and Opportunities, pages 5-8, March 2014.

¹⁸ **Layering** entails examination of on-going humanitarian assistance and development programs and “flexing” them to target the same populations when appropriate. For example, implementing FTF and Health programs into an area with existing FFP MYAPS would be a form of layering. **Sequencing** is when humanitarian assistance is no longer needed, programming can mainstream resilience concerns into development activities. For example, as a FFP program ends FTF could pick up productivity work and linkages to markets, ensuring that the growth component of resilience is continued. **Integrating** seeks to ensure resilience-building activities and vulnerable populations are included in humanitarian and development programs. Integration also speaks to improved hand-off or coordination between humanitarian and development assistance programs.

Expected Results:

USAID/Mali's resilience DO will achieve improved nutritional status, water supply, hygiene and sanitation in the target zone (Mopti). Institutions and communities will be strengthened to address climate change adaptation. Targeted communities will have increased skills for coping with conflict and resilience to violent extremism; and economic livelihoods, particularly for out of school youth, will be diversified and improved.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Global Acute Malnutrition
- Number of Severe and Moderately Hungry Households
- Depth of Poverty
- Levels of Conflict

Critical Assumptions:

- Increasing temperatures, rainfall variability and price volatility will continue to challenge food security for the most vulnerable Malians, likely requiring future humanitarian response.
- Extremist elements will be present and continue to pose a threat, but opportunities exist to mitigate against future conflicts, particularly at the community level.

Alignment with GOM Plans, Policies, and Programs:

USAID/Mali's resilience strategy is fully in line with the GOM's policies and strategies addressing climate change, nutrition, food security and economic growth including: the National Food Security Plan, the National Nutrition Policy, the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCR/2012-2017), the National Policy on Climate Change (PNCC/2011), the National Investment Plan for the Agricultural Sector. The GOM, along with the Regional Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), the UN Food and Agricultural Organization and other donors' agencies such as USAID are members of the Global Alliance for Resilience in the Sahel and West Africa (AGIR). Under this framework, Mali and its partners are expected to complete a Country Resilience Plan by end July 2014. USAID's resilience strategy will inform and be informed by the national resilience plan.

IR 2.1 Nutrition and health status, water supply, hygiene and sanitation improved (Social Resilience)

Premise: When faced with a shock, people living in poor health, nutrition, hygiene and sanitation conditions are more sensitive and require more outside assistance than those in better conditions. Hence, access to basic social services is an underlying condition for an increased capacity to resist and adapt to shocks (Social Resilience).

Development Hypothesis: If access to quality high-impact health and nutrition, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services are ensured, then the adaptive capacity of vulnerable populations will improve.

Interventions will improve the health and nutritional status, water supply, and hygiene and sanitation related behavior. Illustrative high-impact technical interventions include: the promotion of maternal, infant and young child nutrition from conception to two years of age; essential nutrition actions (breastfeeding, complementary feeding, nutrition care of sick/malnourished children, micronutrients supplementation/Vitamin A, Iron and Folic Acid, Iodized Salt, maternal nutrition); de-worming; integrated community-based management of acute malnutrition; hand-washing with soap; community-

led total sanitation, provision of potable water (e.g. wells), and point-of-use water treatment and storage, reproductive health, disease prevention and treatment.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Percent of households using an improved sanitation facility
- Percent of households using an improved drinking water source
- Prevalence of Children 6-23 months receiving a minimum acceptable diet

IR 2.2 Resilience to climatic shocks and disaster risk reduction strategies strengthened (Climate Resilience)

Premise: In the Sahel, climate variability (primarily manifested through drought) is the number one, most recurring stress. Rainfall fluctuation and uncertainty is the leading cause of food insecurity in that zone. For the populations living in marginal agricultural and agro-pastoral zones of the Sahel region of Mali, timely and reliable weather/rainfall forecast information is paramount. With that information, coupled with increased inclusion of climate change considerations in governance systems (communal-level planning and strengthened capacity of NGOs in targeted areas in climate change adaptation) and increased knowledge of water harvesting, soil management and other climate adaptation strategies populations can improve their adaptive capacity.

Development Hypothesis: If high-quality weather and other natural disaster forecasting/warning is provided equitably to and used by the most vulnerable populations, if local governments incorporate climate change adaptation and early warning into planning, and if effective adaptive practices including soil and water conservation are adopted, then vulnerable populations will increase their resilience to stresses of climate variability and change.

Illustrative activities: As part of the Global Climate Change (GCC) initiative, interventions will improve the resilience of rain-fed areas of Mali to climate change and variability. Illustrative activities will include: testing of key adaptive strategies; dissemination of information about effective adaptive strategies; reduction of barriers to widespread adoption of adaptation strategies; capacity-building of public, civil society and private sectors to integrate climate change adaptation into policy and planning; and capacity-building of institutions and stakeholders to analyze and use climate data and predictions for decision-making; local early warning systems; emergency preparedness and response plans. The design of the GCC program was based on the findings of the analyses conducted as part of the Mali Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment (Annex 1, map A1).

Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of stakeholders with increased capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change as a result of USG assistance, disaggregated sex
- Number of institutions with improved capacity to address climate change adaptation as a result of USG assistance
- Number of people receiving training in global climate change adaptation as a result of USG assistance (men/women)
- Number of communities with disaster early warning/responses systems working effectively

IR 2.3 Drivers of Conflict Mitigated (Conflict Resilience)

Premise: Violent conflicts are extreme shocks to communities and individuals causing physical destruction and emotional trauma lasting for years after the end of the conflict.¹⁹ Addressing underlying drivers and strengthening communities' ability to manage conflict will increase resilience. In addition, the same drivers of community-level conflicts in Mali have created fertile ground for extremism. Empowering communities, particularly youth, to manage these conflict drivers will also make them more resistant to extremist ideology and recruitment.

Development Hypothesis: If dispute resolution capabilities are fostered, and formal and informal social institutions are participatory and inclusive in their decision making; then intergroup cooperation, early problem solving around grievances, and social resilience will increase.²⁰

Communities in Mali have faced shocks and stresses that affect inter-communal relationships. Institutions and communities, often interconnected, respond either positively or negatively to different shocks and stresses which, in turn, lead to positive or negative second round effects. According to USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, *negative resilience* perpetuates stable structures that are repressive, violent, or predatory. The implementation of strict Sharia Law in the North, which decreased violence but instilled fear at the expense of the rule of law, is an example. *Positive resilience* is the ability of communities to mitigate, adapt and recover from shocks and stressors, while simultaneously maintaining or enhancing institutional legitimacy. The ultimate goal of this IR is to enhance long-term positive resilience. This will be done through targeting networks between and among communities and government institutions; fostering positive behaviors and norms; supporting innovative problem solving; and adoption of lessons learned at the community level to address challenges.

The current link between communities and any level of government in Mali is extremely weak. The more a community and its individuals are *interconnected* and communities are connected to each other, the more they can resist and recover from shocks and find new ways to adapt to their circumstances. Resorting to destabilizing *behaviors*, such as short-term military interventions, have lowered the adaptive capacity of Malian citizens, their institutions and the overall system. Encouraging *innovation* by institutions, communities and individuals can create opportunity for new approaches for resolving problems and recovering from shocks.²¹ Fostering *institutional memory* enables institutions to form, adapt and change in light of previous events and to account for important lessons learned.²²

In addition, a country's risk of violent extremism is clearly linked to the reality or perception of the lack of justice – a key pillar of good governance, for the general population. Lack of access to justice combined with perceptions of corruption by the elite and impunity of individuals and groups has been used to justify violent actions. The perceived lack of accountability has led some, especially in the North, to seek restitution for real or perceived wrongs outside of the law. At the same time the failure of the government to provide justice has been one of the primary complaints by citizens as noted in the recent

¹⁹ From USAID's *Livelihoods and Conflict Toolkit* (2005), 4.

²⁰ Theories of Change, Indicator Development in Conflict Management & Mitigation, USAID/CMM (2010), 7.

²¹ Frauke De Weijer. Resilience: a Trojan Horse for a New Way of Thinking? Discussion Paper (European Center for Development Policy Management, January 2013), ii.

²² Patricia Longstaff, Nicholas Armstrong, Keli Perrin, Whitney Parker, and Matthew Hidek,. "Building Resilient Communities: A Preliminary Framework for Assessment." *Homeland Security Affairs* VI, no. 3 (September 2010), 7.

Systems Thinking Analysis and Democracy, Rights and Governance Assessment. Inefficiency of the official system has encouraged most people to rely on traditional justice systems.

USAID interventions under this IR will address causes of violent conflict through grassroots efforts to promote reconciliation and counter violent extremism (CVE) using the concepts listed above, as well as through increasing access to justice. These interventions will address both the conflict drivers and the methods that communities use to mitigate these tensions without resorting to violence. USAID will support the use of these traditional justice systems as useful tools for managing conflicts while at the same time supporting linkages to a formal justice system that is increasingly realizing that it must provide local level justice.

Countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts will address the drivers of conflict, which extremist organizations have used as recruitment tools. These include youth unemployment, lack of education or jobs, lack of positive opportunities for political participation and frustration with government ineffectiveness.²³ Positive messaging campaigns, which build upon Mali's long, proud history of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, will be supported using both old and new communications technologies in order to counteract messaging and recruitment efforts by extremists. In addition to these conflict-specific interventions, USAID/Mali will also work to incorporate a conflict-sensitive approach to program design and implementation. Programs - whether they are in health, agriculture or another sector - will have an eye toward how an intervention could increase or reduce the risk of conflict within the beneficiary community.

Finally, valuable "lessons learned" gleaned from CVE experience to date recommend collaboration between local government authorities and civil society organizations to identify priorities for community improvement projects; integration of capacity building training (ie: leadership, transparency, budget management) around and throughout community project implementation; an incremental approach to community projects - starting with smaller projects to consolidate skills; and assignment of responsibilities and working with the level of government that is closest to citizens.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Percentage of community disputes in targeted areas resolved peacefully
- Percentage of women/marginalized groups actively involved in dispute resolution systems
- Percentage of population in a targeted community supporting moderate ideologies countering messaging by extremist groups

IR 2.4 Livelihoods among vulnerables diversified and improved (Economic Resilience)

Premise: Increasing the resilience of vulnerable populations, including youth, means providing ample opportunity for those vulnerable populations to mitigate risk and adapt to shocks as they face them. In a very real sense, this means providing a diverse set of tools with which people and communities can

²³ Evidence-based literature on CVE indicates reducing poverty is not sufficient to reduce violent extremism. Rather, CVE efforts need to focus on a mixture of outcomes including creating / reinforcing positive social networks, reducing barriers to full political and economic participation by at risk groups, facilitating local governments to engage in areas where they have been absent, and increasing access to justice and fighting impunity. See *Dampening Processes of Radicalization at the Individual and Societal Level*, USAID Evidence Summit on Development to Counter Insurgency, September 2010 and *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency*, USAID September 2011, among others.

respond to destabilizing forces, whether they be economic, political, social, or environmental. By lowering their vulnerabilities to these kinds of forces and improving their livelihoods through diversified income generating activities, on and off the farm, vulnerable communities become more resilient.

Development Hypothesis: If economic activities are diversified, if employment opportunities and skill-building opportunities are increased, particularly for youth, and if market risk reduction strategies are strengthened, then the livelihood of the vulnerable populations will be improved.

Interventions will aim to create greater opportunities for income generation both on and off the farm, facilitate access to markets and trade, reduce intra-annual and inter-annual price fluctuations, reduce production risks and provide food-based safety nets when needed. Economic growth opportunities in agriculture, livestock, and fisheries, as well as wage labor, trade and other off-farm employment opportunities will be pursued. Programs will provide various types of assistance including training (i.e. literacy, vocational, technical); access to information, services and inputs (e.g. seeds, fodder, veterinary services and tools); infrastructural improvement (gardens, irrigated perimeters, fisheries, storage), improved access to credit and markets; and cash grants to (re)start income generating activities in and outside the agricultural sector, food vouchers, food and feed banks, savings and loans systems.

Youth as a whole make up 69 percent of Mali's population and the vast majority of them are uneducated and unemployed. This situation is especially critical for female youth whom only four in ten have gone to school. In the south, innovative approaches are needed to offer this generation viable options for gainful occupation and employment. In the North, youth need support to find ways to make a living wage as well as help to recover from the effects of the violent conflict that has taken place. Limited integration of youth into Malian society represents a threat to social stability as 300,000 new youth enter the job market each year, most with little to any basic life skills and vocational skills.²⁴ Therefore, USAID sees support for at-risk youth as critical for livelihoods and mitigating the potential for conflict. Interventions will consolidate the emergency interventions in the Transition Objective (intermediate result 3 - education/health services for conflict-affected provided) while establishing and strengthening educational opportunities for out-of-school children and youth. Learners will gain skills and knowledge needed to become self-sufficient and resilient. These interventions will contribute to USAID's Youth in Development Policy, mainstreaming youth and strengthening youth's basic skills.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Number of people assisted through livelihood restoration activities
- Number of people receiving USG assistance in diversified economic activities
- Number of jobs created attributed to USG interventions
- Number of youth that develop their own micro-enterprises or are self-employed

Development Objective 3: Prosperity - Socio-Economic Well-Being Advanced

Development Hypothesis: Deepened and sustained investments in health, basic education, and agriculture-led economic growth initiatives, integrated with other democratic governance and resilience programs, will serve as the engine of prosperity and sustainable development in Mali.

DO 3 is a composite of USAID/Mali's primary service delivery programs - Global Health Initiative (GHI), Feed the Future (FTF) and basic education – and will absorb the vast majority of the Mission's

²⁴ The Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2012–17 GPRSP)

programmatic resources. The Prosperity DO's Intermediate Results will be intricately linked with each other and the other DOs (inclusive value chain programs are a driver of resilience in agro-pastoral communities, for example, and climate change adaptability is crucial for economic growth), but they will also be largely independent units. The strategic approaches for each Intermediate Result are structured by Presidential Initiatives and/or Agency strategies; have been developed based on sound evidence, past experience, value for money, and exhaustive consultations with the GOM and other development partners; and, in the case of GHI and FTF, have been reviewed and approved by an interagency process.

Expected Results:

USAID/Mali's Prosperity DO will lead to increases in agricultural production, producers' incomes, improvements in nutritional status, and a reduction in rural poverty among target beneficiaries and value chains. Approximately 100,000 hectares will be developed and 100,000 beneficiaries will benefit from adoption of new technologies. In the area of health, key results over the five year strategy period will include reduced maternal mortality and under-five mortality by 30%, reduced infant mortality by 25%, increased modern contraceptive prevalence by 5%, reduced underweight and stunted children under five by 30%, reduced prevalence of wasted children under five by 50% and prevalence of underweight women by 30%. With support for basic education literacy, approximately 440,000 Malian primary education students (or 22% of the target population), will receive reading interventions at the early grades level and 12,000 teachers will improve their reading instruction delivery.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Agriculture Sector Gross Domestic Product
- Maternal and Child Deaths
- Youth (5-24 yrs) Literacy

Critical Assumptions:

- The security situation improves, allowing USAID/Mali to implement and monitor activities in the Gao region (health); Timbuktu and Mopti (agriculture).
- GOM and development partners will embrace sector objectives (health, agriculture, education) and provide sufficient resources to fulfill GOM commitments and strategic plans.
- The GOM will appropriately and effectively continue to coordinate donor investments.
- Rainfall is predictable and sufficient, allowing farmers to plan their agricultural seasons and achieve expected yields.
- The private sector is supportive of FTF programs.
- Funding support from other development partners continue in Mali throughout the CDCS.

Alignment with GOM Plans, Policies, and Programs:

- Elaborated at the IR level

IR 3.1 Use of high-impact health services and healthy behaviors increased

Premise: The goal of this investment is sustained improvements in health through increased use of high-impact health services and healthy behaviors to end preventable child and maternal death. This will be achieved through programming in three component areas: 1) delivery of an integrated package of high-impact health services (HIHS) at the community level, 2) social and behavior change communication and social marketing (SBCC/SM), and 3) health systems strengthening (HSS). These three components have

*shown, through research and best practice, both internationally and in Mali, to be the most effective and efficient in delivering health interventions and in reducing the most common causes of preventable illness and death in Mali.*²⁵

Development Hypothesis: The provision of high-impact health services at the community level (supply) coupled with SBCC messages to encourage people to use these services and to adopt healthy behaviors (demand), will result in increased use of high impact health services and healthy behaviors. This, in turn, will cause sustained improvements in health for Malians.

Good health is essential to improved productivity, higher incomes and reductions in poverty in Mali. Mali's poor health status is evidenced by high infant, under-five, and maternal mortality and morbidity, and high fertility. This is costly to individuals, families, and communities, and ultimately to the nation as it tries to respond to the chronic burden of disease and reduced productivity. Mali's poor health indicators are due to low access to and use of high-impact health services and poor health behaviors. Therefore, achieving the USAID/Mali Health Intermediate Result (IR) "Use of High Impact Health Services and Healthy Behaviors Increased" with a particular focus on the health of the most vulnerable groups (infants, children under five, women of reproductive age) will help to improve Malian's health status.

A 2011 external evaluation of the MOH's last ten-year strategy²⁶ identified several systemic weaknesses that impede progress toward achieving national health objectives. Key findings include: Local health systems and Social and Behavioral Change Communications (SBCC) interventions do not provide enough coverage of quality health services, and critical health interventions do not reach the population, especially people who live far from Community Health Centers (CSCOMs); Key national and local health systems are not able to provide all of the inputs (commodities, human resources, etc.) needed to support health services at the local level; and the Health Management Information System (HMIS) does not provide accurate and timely data for informed decision-making.

Based on the epidemiology and conditions in Mali, USAID program interventions will address technical areas of: a) maternal, neonatal, and child health; b) family planning and reproductive health; c) malaria; and d) infectious diseases including HIV and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). The Mali health program will represent a scale-up and intensification of proven approaches to achieve greater impact on national health indicators. It will also include several ways that new interventions can achieve even greater impact, such as a reduced number of partners and better programmatic integration to enhance coordination and efficiencies; consolidated geographic focus and implementation in every district in target regions; inclusion of the private sector providers at the community level; a greater emphasis on local-level governance, transparency, and accountability; a greater emphasis on health financing. The Mali Health program will be implemented in peri-urban area of the district of Bamako and four other regions: Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso and Gao in the North as security permits (TO 1), representing nearly 65% of the total population of Mali.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Maternal, under-five and infant mortality reduced
- Modern method contraceptive prevalence rate increased

²⁵ All these are already discussed and explicitly demonstrated in the Global Health Strategy (GHI) for Mali that was developed in 2011 and confirmed by the Health Portfolio High Quality Evaluation conducted in 2013.

²⁶ Evaluation Externe du Plan Décennal de Développement Sanitaire et Social, 1998-2007. Ministère de la Santé et Ministère du Développement Social de la Solidarité et des Personnes Agées. Bamako, Mali. 19 August, 2011.

Alignment with GOM Plans, Policies, and Programs:

The GOM's Strategy Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCR) 2012-2017 includes maternal and child health, malaria, social development, nutrition, HIV/AIDS, and WASH with a long-term vision of improving the quality of life of Malians. All health sector activities in Mali by all implementers are governed by the MOH's 10-year health strategy and 5-year implementation plan, called the Health and Social Development Plan (PDDSS) and Health Sector Development Program (PRODESS), respectively. Programs coordinate with a wealth of other development partners, including: 1) Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM) (\$60 million/year) on HIV/AIDS and malaria, of which the USG contributes one third of the GFATM's resources; and 2) The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and USAID together provide nearly the entire public sector supply of contraceptive commodities.

IR 3.2 Poverty and malnutrition reduced

Premise: While migration to the cities is increasing, 80% of Mali's population still depends on agriculture for their livelihoods. The rural agricultural sector holds the greatest promise for spurring broad-based economic growth, livelihood development, and improved nutrition. Through FTF, USAID/Mali can address high levels of malnutrition by promoting nutrition-sensitive agriculture production and processing; delivering high-impact, evidence-based interventions focused on behavior change communication techniques to improve child care practices and dietary diversity. Building capacity in education and research, including technical training and degree programs, can ensure that new technologies and best practices are integrated into focused value chain strengthening.

Development Hypothesis: Local successes in agricultural intensification and marketing demonstrate that with improved technologies, better water management, sustainable agricultural practices, local community engagement and an enhanced enabling environment, Mali's agricultural potential to feed its population, generate economic growth, and jumpstart regional trade can be fully realized.

While Mali faces many agricultural production challenges, certain comparative advantages enable it to be the largest agricultural producer of the Sahelian region and second only to Nigeria in all of West Africa. Large areas suitable for dry-land agriculture make Mali a leading producer of cereal grains, and the Niger River delta provides rich potential for irrigated agriculture. There remains great potential for expansion of production and value addition. There are vast areas of suitable land for rice production under different production systems, and in the *bas-fonds* production system in Sikasso alone, there is the potential for increases in production of some 900,000 tons covering an additional 300,000 hectares that could affect the livelihoods of 170,000 rural households.

FTF is a whole-of-government initiative focused on reducing poverty and malnutrition, as measured by stunting, by 20 percent. Mali's FTF program will launch a new generation of rural entrepreneurs by developing sustainable agricultural and health systems, delivering technology and knowledge, and building local institutional capacity to energize the GOM and spur innovation in the private sector. The initiative targets investments in three value chains: i) Millet and sorghum; ii) Rice; and iii) Livestock, focused on cattle and small ruminants. FTF strengthens value chains at points where they are most constrained; adapts technologies to local conditions; and enhances the ability of public and private delivery, extension and advisory services to disseminate information to Malian producers, processors and other actors.

USAID will concentrate its interventions in 113 target communes in three of Mali's eight regions-- Sikasso, Mopti, and Timbuktu--and two communes in the Millennium Change Corporation intervention zones in the Alatona region of Segou. The entire zone of intervention covers approximately 2.5 million people, or around 440,000 households, dominated by smallholder subsistence farmers and their families. An estimated 500,000 people in these communes are directly targeted by FTF interventions, with an additional 1.26 million benefiting indirectly. Targeted nutrition interventions will reach up to 600,000 mothers and children under 5 years old, contributing to the overall reduction of under-nutrition by 30 percent in the target areas.

Therefore, USAID/Mali can achieve: 1) increases in agricultural production, 2) increases in producers' incomes, 3) improvements in nutritional status, and 4) a reduction in rural poverty among target beneficiaries by implementing the following: improving, diversifying, and intensifying sustainable agriculture; improving natural resources management; developing and strengthening access to inputs, information, and credit to support the selected value chains; building and improving agricultural production and storage-related infrastructures, strengthening markets, including increased regional and international trade; diversifying food production and consumption; improving consumption and other nutrition-related behaviors; and Building and improving public-private partnerships.²⁷

Illustrative Indicators:

- Value of incremental sales
- Prevalence of underweight, stunted, and wasted women and children reduced
- Number of farmers who have applied improved technologies
- Number of hectares under improved management

Alignment with GOM Plans, Policies, and Programs:

The GOM has already developed a Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program-5 Year Investment Strategy (CAADP-PNIP-SA). This strategy provides a blueprint for agricultural development in Mali from 2011-2015. It focuses on strategic investments in five value chains: rice, millet and sorghum, maize, inland fisheries, and livestock. USAID/Mali has responded the GOM's efforts at aligning donors strategically, opting to focus on the millet and sorghum, rice, and livestock value chains. The USG is also active in donor coordination and participates in the Private Sector, Health, Nutrition, Water and Sanitation, Irrigation, and Environment donor groups. USAID/Mali currently coordinates all donor activities and messaging to the GOM as head of the Rural Development Donor Group (Groupe Thematique-Economie Agricole et Rurale).

IR 3.3 Early grade reading for girls and boys improved

Premise: USAID's Education Strategy is based on the premise that education is foundational to human development and critical to broad-based economic growth and poverty reduction. Specifically, literacy is a necessary pre-condition for sustainable agriculture and economic growth, healthy populations, a strong democratic foundation, a resilient people, and peaceful coexistence of people with social and cultural diversity. USAID/Mali is committed to Goals 1 and 3 of USAID's Global Education Strategy: 1) Improved reading skills for 100 million children in primary grades; and 3) Increased equitable access to

²⁷ Derived from Mali's FtF Strategy (2011) and the Cereal Value Chain Performance Evaluation (2013).

education in crisis and conflict environments for 15 million learners. Improved literacy will improve the socio-economic well-being of Malians, laying the foundation for economic growth and prosperity.

Development Hypothesis: If USAID/Mali improves reading instructional practices, ensures an adequate and timely supply of evidence-based reading materials, establishes at the classroom-level a continuous assessment system, and builds the capacity of education system actors to improve reading delivery systems, then prospects for prosperity will improve.

Mali has made significant gains in improving access to education over the past five years in terms of increased enrollment, but educational outcomes continue to be some of the worst in the world. Data from the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2012 indicate that for educational outcomes such as literacy, school life expectancy, and graduation, only Niger and Afghanistan have poorer results. The 2009 and 2011 early grade reading assessment (EGRA) conducted in Mali indicated that the vast majority of children in 2nd grade could not read a single work of connected text, either in a Malian national language or in French. The 2010 national student assessment results show that only 41 percent of second grade students in Mali perform satisfactorily in reading comprehension, while the results of sixth grade students are 48 percent in French. This suggests that the education system may not be adequately equipping students with the skills they need to contribute to Mali's development.

The Malian education system is faced with high teacher absenteeism and severe loss of instructional time resulting in low quality of teaching and learning as evidenced by the fact that Malian students repeat each grade far more often than their West African counterparts. These challenges are compound by lack of evidence-based reading materials and other instructional materials and low teacher qualifications. Results obtained from a study conducted by USAID/Mali show that only 27 percent of professors who prepare teachers for the classroom had been trained to teach basic reading. As part of offering support to each actor in the "value chain," USAID programming will build capacity of professors of teachers in the area of reading instruction.

The goal of this investment therefore is improved reading skills for students in the early grades in the formal and non-formal primary education, reaching 20% of Mali's total primary education-level population. This will be achieved in selective geographic areas by improving reading instructional practices, providing evidence-based reading materials, establishing classroom-level continuous assessment system, and building the capacity of education system actors to provide schools with all the requisite elements for successful reading instruction. USAID/Mali education programming will inform a research agenda leading to revise policy, curricula, and/or lesson plans to address identified weaknesses to improve reading instruction. Evidence-based data on student reading skills will be provided to spur more effective efforts to improve reading delivery systems.

Illustrative Indicators:

- Proportion of grade two students whose oral/reading/fluency (ORF) scores meet or exceed expectations for reading fluency (as defined by the national reading standards)
- Percentage of teachers demonstrating mastery of core language arts instructional techniques
- Number of learners receiving reading interventions at the primary level

Alignment with GOM Plans, Policies, and Programs:


Programs follow under the GOM's interim plan 2014-2016 have explicitly put the development of student's reading skills as one of the priority strategic approaches in addressing the low level of the

quality of education. USAID provides significant investments to improve early grade reading competencies in the geographic areas where the World Bank, through the Global Partnership for Education \$41.7 million grant project, is doing school construction to increase access.


ANNEXES

2. Maps: A1 (Vulnerability), A2 (Drought frequency), A3 (Population density)

Annex 1 -- Maps -- A1 : Mali Vulnerability map



A2 Drought Frequency map



A3 Population Density map

